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The Privatization of U.S. Fisheries Through Catch Share Programs
Fish, Inc.
Executive Summary
When people think of fishing, they probably imagine an independent sea captain and his crew braving the elements in a 
small vessel to bring a fresh catch to shore and to our plates. But the current focus of U.S. policy for managing our fisher-
ies, called catch shares, is destroying the way of life of our nation’s fishermen and coastal communities.  This time-honored 
trade is being replaced by a privatized system that often leaves the future of our nation’s fish, one of our most precious natural 
resources, in the hands of a small number of larger operations, whose primary goal is often immediate profit rather than sus-
tainable use and long-term conservation. 
The United States lost most of its family farms to the large industrialized agriculture model. Catch shares create similar condi-
tions on our seas by transferring the wealth of our fish populations from the public trust into private hands, by allocating a 
percentage quota of the total amount of fish that can be caught in a year and allowing these quota to be leased, bought and 
sold. When catch shares are given to fishermen, those who receive the largest initial distribution of shares — or have the most 
capital to buy and lease shares — often gain control over the entire fishery. Smaller-scale traditional fishermen are pushed out 
of the fishery while larger companies, which often use fishing practices that stress ocean ecosystems, take over. 
Proponents of catch shares claim they are the best solution to profitably, safely and sustainably manage our fisheries. In this 
report, Food & Water Watch examines these claims and finds them all wanting. 
Catch shares cause economic devastation. 
Catch shares only increase profits for some fishermen by cutting hundreds of others out of the fishery entirely. Widespread job 
loss and reduced wages drag coastal communities that are already struggling in this economy into dire economic situations. 
Meanwhile, a privileged few are able to profit from exclusive access to a public resource.
Catch shares fail to sustain the health of our fisheries.
Catch shares are only a way to distribute fish among fishermen and have no built-in sustainability measures — overfishing is 
controlled separately by setting limits on the total number of fish that can be caught. In fact, catch shares inherently contain 
incentives to use more damaging gear, discard unwanted fish and dismiss adaptive ecosystem-based fishing strategies.
Catch shares fail to achieve legal standards for fishery management. 
The federal law governing our nation’s fisheries, the Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Management Act, specifies that fishery man-
agement must support the long-term economic health of fishing communities, but catch shares are responsible around the 
world for destroying the economic health of coastal ports. Further, an international court found that catch shares violated 
human rights by creating a privileged class of fishermen in a privatized industry. 
Catch shares aren’t fair.
Our nation and our oceans deserve better than a system that results in an unfair giveaway of public resources to private 
entities. Fishermen, rather than being cut out of the fishery, should be a key part of the management process. Smart fishery 
management can be fair and equitable, maintain public control of the resource, minimize damage to the environment, and 
promote a better life for our nation’s fishermen and coastal and fishing communities, and a better product for consumers.
Food & Water Watch
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Privatization by Any Other Name
There are many different types of catch share programs, 
particularly in the United States, where each program is 
designed specifically for an individual fish or group of fish. 
In this report, we generally call these “catch shares,” but 
they may also be called: limited access privilege pro-
grams (LAPPs), individual fishing quotas (IFQs), individual 
vessel quotas (IVQs), individual transferable quotas (ITQs), 
quota management systems (QMS), sectors or communi-
ty development quotas (CDQ) (among many other names, 
each with their own unique aspects — see the appendix 
for details). These programs could be designed to pro-
mote sustainability, economic opportunity and fairness, 
but the vast majority of catch share regimes privatize the 
fishing industry instead, leading to numerous socio-eco-
nomic and environmental problems. 
Catch share programs have been pitched as a way to end 
overfishing, motivate resource stewardship, and increase pro-
ductivity, profits and long-term stability for fishermen. Yet in 
practice, these programs fail on all these counts. Worldwide, 
catch share programs that privatize fisheries prove unsuccess-
ful and even devastating for fishing communities, the marine 
environment and consumers.
Our agricultural system has long operated under extreme 
economic pressure to “get big or get out.” Numerous smaller 
farms rapidly consolidated into fewer large factory farms over 
the course of the last several decades, resulting in the near-
death of the family farm and the loss of food quality, food 
safety and consumer choice. Unfortunately, the National 
Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS), the federal government 
body responsible for the management and conservation of 
our ocean fish populations, is heavily promoting catch share 
programs throughout the United States. It seems to be only 
a matter of time before our fisheries follow a similar path as 
agriculture.
The Wrong Choice
The United States’ tradition of fishing is in danger. One by one, our nation’s regional fisheries are being forced under a management system that pushes smaller-scale 
fishermen out of their jobs, leaves crew members scrambling for pay and turns fishing 
communities into ghost towns. These systems are called catch shares, individual fishing 
quotas, sector management or catch-and-trade programs. They privatize our oceans, 
often leaving the future of one of our nation’s most precious natural resources — our 
fish — in the hands of a small number of larger fishing firms, whose primary goal is often 
immediate profit rather than sustainable use and long-term conservation. 
Privatizing U.S. Fisheries
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Catch Share Programs in the United States
Since an eight-year moratorium on their development was 
lifted in 2004,1 catch shares have spread rapidly through-
out the United States. In the president’s federal budget 
for fiscal year 2011, NMFS expressed a goal of having 20 
catch share programs by 2016.2 As shown in our map on 
existing U.S. catch share programs (see inside cover),3 
catch shares already exist in many areas and are being 
developed in other regions. 
Recent studies estimate that between 28 to 63 percent of 
the fish stocks in the world are depleted.4 Nationally, a long 
recession and slow recovery has left the people of the United 
States struggling to make ends meet. Our government’s policy 
of privatizing our nation’s fisheries abdicates their responsi-
bility for the stewardship of our resources, while causing fur-
ther job losses in our coastal and fishing communities. This is 
the wrong choice for our fish, fishermen and future.  
The Design and Downfall of Privatized Catch 
Shares
Catch share programs define the amount of fish that certain 
fishermen are allowed to catch. Scientists and managers first 
set the total allowable catch (TAC) of a fishery, which is the 
amount of fish that all companies and individuals combined 
are allowed to catch each year. The fishery managers then 
determine the size of a catch share, generally a percentage of 
the TAC designated for one individual. For example, one fish-
erman might receive 2 percent of a 1 million pound TAC of 
red snapper. This means that the fisherman can catch 20,000 
pounds of red snapper for the year. The percentage of TAC a 
person receives is referred to as their “share” or “quota.” 
Catch shares can be distributed in a number of ways, but the 
most common method in the United States involves giving 
away catch shares to companies and individuals based on 
their catch history (how much fish they caught in the past 
during a certain period of time). Once the catch shares are 
given away, the owners are allowed to lease or sell their quo-
tas in a private market system. 
While this may sound like a fair approach, the reality is that 
smaller fishermen who fish more slowly and catch less are 
pushed out when the amount of annual catch to qualify for 
shares is set high (see graphic: “How catch shares cause job 
losses”). Many captains have to buy or lease quota to go fish-
ing and this added expense equates to less money available 
to pay crew members. Fishermen who leave the fishery are 
left saddled with boats they can’t sell, since new entrants to 
the fishery are blocked by the expensive burden of having 
to buy or lease quota to fish — which can be tens or even 
hundreds of thousands of dollars.5 Ultimately, the industry 
is skewed toward industrial fishing vessels employing fewer 
people and using fishing methods that can be ecologically 
damaging.
Catch shares are often treated as permanent property rights 
even though U.S. federal law governing fisheries manage-
ment expressly states they are revocable permits and cannot 
be construed as rights.6 They have been bought and sold, 
inherited and taxed as inheritance, used as collateral, and 
fought over in divorce court.7 However, it is unclear how 
well catch share quotas can be revoked or modified once 
they are issued.8 In other words, the United States is rushing 
down a path of fisheries management from which it cannot 
easily return.
The fundamental problem with this system is that the govern-
ment gives catch share owners their transferable shares for 
free, and essentially in perpetuity, creating a system that keeps 
the right to fish in private hands. Some argue that privatiza-
tion is necessary to avoid the “tragedy of the commons.”9 
The tragedy of the commons is the idea that when multiple 
individuals use a common resource for their personal ben-
efit, the resource is likely to be depleted by people trying to 
get the biggest share as quickly as possible before others do 
so. This happens even though destruction of the resource is 
against everyone’s collective long-term interest in managing 
the resource well and using it sustainably into the future. But 
the United States manages many public resources without re-
sorting to privatization — our national forests, oil and mineral 
deposits, grazing lands and wireless airwaves are considered 
public resources. The government holds these resources in 
trust and manages them for the use and benefit of all people 
in the United States. The government sells or auctions access 
to them to individuals for their use or extraction. 
As with other public resources, privatization is not necessary 
for effective fishery management. Fish in U.S. waters belong 
to the public,10 to be shared by all, for the maximum benefit 
of all, not just a handful of people or companies.
Ultimately, the industry is 
skewed toward industrial fishing 
vessels employing fewer people 
and using fishing methods that 
can be ecologically damaging.
Food & Water Watch
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Economic Devastation
Catch share programs are based on the idea of maximizing 
the economic efficiency of the fishery. Unfortunately, this 
“optimization” or “rationalization” comes at the cost of ex-
cluding large numbers of people from the system entirely. As 
one researcher summarized in 2006, catch share programs 
“can amount to an unjustified, and highly unpopular, transfer 
of wealth from the public to specially favored individuals. 
In practice, many fishermen or entrepreneurs have become 
inordinately wealthy following the inception of [these] pro-
grams,”14 while others have been forced into poverty.
Distribution of Shares
While there are several different ways to determine who gets 
the initial shares in a new catch share program, the most 
common method used in the United States is to select a few 
years of historic catch data from the fishery to determine 
each fisherman’s proportional share. This initial allocation 
of shares gives a huge windfall to a small group of people 
and businesses. Typically, no attempt is made to collect fees 
or compensation for use of the public resource. Those who 
receive the largest initial distribution of shares — or have the 
most capital to buy and lease shares — often gain control 
over an entire fishery, pushing smaller fishermen out of fish-
ing and even into bankruptcy.15
There have also been cases where new fishing firms have 
deliberately entered a fishery prior to the implementation 
of catch shares in order to establish a catch history and 
profit from the initial allocation of shares.23 Catch shares are 
touted as a way to end the race to fish, but when fisheries are 
controlled with a TAC and no other restrictions, fishermen 
compete in short seasons to catch fish quickly. This specula-
tive fishing exacerbates the race in pre-catch share years.24
Once quotas are distributed, the fishery moves rapidly 
towards consolidation. In 2010, less than five months after 
catch shares were implemented in the groundfish fleet in 
New England, 55 out of the initial 500 boats in the fishery 
controlled 61 percent of the revenue.25 In another example, 
the ocean quahog fishery in the mid-Atlantic became so con-
solidated that one firm controlled 35 percent of the available 
quota two years after the program began.26 Internationally, in 
New Zealand’s catch share fisheries, “the majority of quota 
was purchased and held by a small number of large-vertically 
integrated companies.”27 One company, Sanford, purchased 
about half its total quota, while another, Talleys, bought 99 
percent of its quota. These large purchases resulted in many 
small boat operators leaving the fishery.28 
Many quota holders don’t even fish themselves. Instead 
they become “armchair fishermen” or “fishery landlords” by 
More Than a Decade of Concerns 
In a review for Congress on catch share programs in 
1999, the National Research Council (NRC) highlighted 
eight major concerns with catch share programs:11
• The fairness of initial allocations
• The effects of catch shares on processors
• Increased costs for new fishermen to gain entry
• Consolidations of quota shares (and thus economic 
power)
• The effects of leasing
• Confusion about the nature of the privilege involved
• Elimination of vessels and reductions in crew
• The equity of gifting a public trust resource12 
Since the moratorium on catch share programs was 
lifted in 2004, nine new catch share programs have been 
implemented in the United States (there are 15 total 
catch share programs as of early 2011) and more are in 
development.13 These programs are plagued by many of 
the same problems highlighted by the NRC more than 
10 years ago, yet the National Oceanic and Atmospheric 
Administration (NOAA) continues to promote catch share 
programs as a preferred management option for our na-
tion’s fisheries.
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leasing their quota for exorbitantly high prices. The Canadian 
halibut fishery switched to a privatized catch share system 
in 1991, and by 2006, 79 percent of the quota was leased 
instead of fished by quota owners themselves.29 A huge fi-
nancial burden was placed on the fishermen who had to pay 
rent to bring in their catch. One study found that, “of the 182 
active halibut fishing vessels in 2006, 37 vessels leased 90 
percent or more of the halibut quota they fished, 67 vessels 
leased 70 percent or more of the halibut quota they fished, 
and 91 vessels (half of the active fleet) leased 50 percent or 
more” of their quota.30 Quota leasing has become the single 
largest operating cost for these fishermen,  pushing them to 
the margins of profitability,31 which could drive more fisher-
men into bankruptcy.32
Job Losses
As a result of this subsidized consolidation, many fisher-
ies have lost well over half of their fishing fleets. In Alaska’s 
Bristol Bay red king crab fishery (part of the Bering Sea and 
Aleutian Islands crab rationalization program), only 89 out of 
251 boats remained the year after catch shares were imple-
mented.33 In early 2010, New England implemented catch 
shares in the groundfish fishery through a “sector” program. 
Members of the community warned, “50-75 percent of the 
fleet and thousands of jobs will be lost in a relatively short 
period of time.”34 Five months after the program was imple-
mented, 253 of the 500 boats in the fishery were sitting at the 
dock, unable to fish without quota.35 Those boats might stay 
there, since small fishermen forced out of the system could 
end up with boats that have no buyers, as the boats have no 
value without quota.36
The same problems are occurring in other parts of the world 
that employ privatized catch share systems. The southern 
bluefin tuna fishery in Australia had approximately 70 per-
cent fewer boats within the first two years of the initiation 
of the catch share system.37 Between 1986 and 1998, on 
average, the number of quota holders in New Zealand’s in-
shore fisheries (which were traditionally dominated by small 
boats) dropped from 95 owners to 67 owners.38 Despite a 
15 percent increase in the TAC of the New Zealand fishing 
fleet, there has been a 26 percent reduction in the number 
of quota owners.39 Hardest hit were the small 6 to 9 meter 
length boats, while mid-sized vessels stayed stable and large 
vessels increased in number.40
Quota leasing also prevents new fishermen from enter-
ing a fishery. One study estimated that it can cost between 
$250,00 and $500,000 for a new entrant to acquire enough 
quota for a single fishing trip in Alaska’s halibut fishery.49 
Windfall Wealth and the Fish Stock Market
The initial distribution of catch shares gifts a select few 
with a windfall of wealth, as it transfers the future value 
of the public fishery into private ownership.16 Immediately 
upon receipt, these privileged few can sell their quota and 
gain an instant profit17 or they can use the expected value 
as collateral to get bank loans.18 Quota owners can use 
these loans to buy additional quota19 or to invest in other 
industries, furthering their own personal profit.20 Many 
choose to hold on to their quota, lease it to other fisher-
men and accrue long-term wealth without actually fish-
ing. 21 Essentially, catch shares turn a fishery into a stock 
market, where quota shares become intangible assets 
with higher market values than the vessels and equipment 
needed to fish, or even the fish themselves.22  How Catch Shares Cause Job Losses 
1. In this hypothetical fishery, boats of three sizes (small, 
medium and large) catch the imaginarifish. The regional 
fishery management council maintains stocks through 
regulatory limits on total allowable catch (TAC), but there 
are problems with fishermen racing to catch as many 
imaginarifish as possible before the TAC is reached.
2. The regional fishery management council suggests 
implementing a catch share program for imaginarifish. 
Because catch shares are based on catch histories, 
more boats enter the fishery and those already fishing 
fish harder to try to raise their catch in the hopes of get-
ting more quota. Aggressive overfishing depletes stock, 
and other fish are killed accidentally when the imaginari-
fish are caught, causing depletion of those fish popula-
tions as well.
3. A catch share program is implemented. The program 
automatically excludes a large number of the small-
est boats because their historical catch amounts do 
not qualify them for shares under the new rules. Catch 
shares are distributed mostly among the medium and 
large boats.
4. In the first year under the catch share program, fisher-
men not granted enough shares to be profitable, and 
other fishermen choosing to make a windfall profit, sell 
or lease their quota shares. Catch shares begin to con-
solidate within the larger boats that have the capital to 
purchase shares from the remaining fishermen. There are 
now far fewer crew jobs available, and local economies 
suffer as workers have less money to spend on various 
goods and entertainment. Fish populations continue to 
decline at the same rate, but a much smaller number 
of much larger boats are catching them. These boats 
use more industrialized catch methods, which can harm 
ocean habitat and cause higher rates of bycatch — the 
accidental catch of marine wildlife.
Food & Water Watch
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Fishermen who already have quota can use their existing 
quota as leverage for loans, but fishermen just starting out 
may have to use personal assets, such as their homes, for the 
required downpayment (between a quarter and half of the 
loan, or $62,500 to $250,000) before they can even catch 
any fish.50 Purchasing the quota outright is out of reach for 
most, since widespread leasing drives up the price of quota.51
Despite widespread academic agreement that catch 
share programs create job loss in communities, NOAA 
Administrator Jane Lubchenco recently announced that 
catch shares are “merely a tool” and “not the cause” of lost 
fishing jobs.52
Wage Losses for Crew Members and Captains 
The precise impacts of catch shares on crew members are 
relatively unknown, but the research that has been done 
belies the claim that crews have safer, better jobs with higher 
wages.53 Traditionally, fishing crews were given a percentage 
of the total catch value, most of which was caught in a short 
fishing season. Crews in fisheries under catch shares are now 
spending months at sea instead of weeks, but are not making 
more money. 
Vessel owners are shifting the costs of leasing additional 
quota onto crews by taking a large percentage of the total 
catch value before calculating wages. Crew members in the 
Canadian halibut fishery received 10 to 20 percent of the 
catch value before catch shares and now receive only 1 to 
5 percent.54 Even the fishermen who own their quota have 
begun to pay their crews these same low wages, because 
it is more profitable for quota owners to lease their quota 
than to fish it themselves while paying their crews the wages 
they used to receive.55 So, in the Canadian halibut fishery, 
although the overall value of the fishery has increased by 
25 percent over 17 years, the crews’ share of that value has 
dropped by 73 percent.56 In the Bristol Bay red king crab and 
Bering Sea snow crab fisheries, some crew members report 
that pay has dropped from 5 to 6 percent of catch value to 
less than 1 percent,57 while an estimated 1,214 crew mem-
bers lost their jobs entirely after catch share implementation 
in those fisheries.58
Fleet Reduction Means Job Losses
“Fleet reduction” — meaning fishermen being cut out of fishing — is often highlighted as a success of catch share 
programs.41 But every time a boat stops fishing, an estimated three to six jobs are lost,42 resulting in struggling coastal 
and fishing communities.  
Catch share program Boats in fishery prior to catch shares
Boats in fishery after 
catch shares Boats lost
Alaska Halibut 3,450 boats in 1994 1,156 boats in 2008 66 percent in 14 years
Alaska Sablefish 1,404 boats in 1994 362 boats in 2008 74 percent in 14 years43
Bering Sea and Aleutian Islands Pollock 100 catcher and 30 catcher-
processor in 1998
90 catcher and 21 catcher-
processor in 2005
10 percent catcher and 30 
percent catcher-processor in 
7 years44
Bering Sea and Aleutian Islands Red King 
Crab
251 boats in 2004 74 boats in 2007-2008 71 percent in 3-4 years
Bering Sea and Aleutian Islands Snow Crab 189 boats in 2004 78 boats in 2007-2008 59 percent in 3-4 years
Pacific Sablefish 328 boats in 2000 87 boats in 2008 73 percent in 8 years45
Gulf of Mexico Red Snapper 546 permits in 2007 466 permits in 2008 15 percent in 1 year
Wreckfish 91 boats in 1990 Less than 5 boats in 2009 95 percent in 19 years46
Surf Clam 128 boats in 1990 50 boats in 2005 61 percent in 15 years47
Ocean Quahog 92 permits in 1991 47 permits in 2005 49 percent in 14 years48
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Community Hardship
The economic hardship and job loss among fishermen due 
to catch share programs have widespread impacts. Related 
industries like processors, baiters and boat repairers also suf-
fer, along with the ports and communities reliant on fishing. 
As unemployment spreads, there is less to spend at grocery 
stores, restaurants and other key community businesses, 
which can eventually lead to a resident exodus in search of 
jobs and opportunity.72 And generally speaking, unemploy-
ment is linked to higher risk for spousal abuse,73 child abuse 
and neglect,74 and increased suicide and divorce rates.
The consolidation of fishing in a region can have profound 
economic and social effects. A study of the Nova Scotia 
groundfish catch share program found that transferability of 
shares resulted in striking regional imbalances in consolida-
tion, as some areas acquired quota at the expense of other 
towns and ports.75 The increasing fortunes of those able to 
take advantage of catch shares in these communities have 
exacerbated disparities of wealth and status and put a strain 
on the values of hard work and equity that held the com-
munities together.76 Regional shifts in quota have also left 
communities in Iceland and Alaska struggling to survive the 
loss of their fishing tradition.77
Processors can also be hurt by quota systems, as some pro-
cessors gain control of the quota and others go out of busi-
ness. In the Alaska halibut and sablefish fishery, catch shares 
reduced the number of halibut processors from 104 to 82 
firms, only 31 of which existed before catch shares.78 Of the 
51 new processing firms, four of them accounted for nearly a 
fourth of the total market share.79 The halibut processors that 
survived the implementation of catch shares lost upwards of 
56 percent of their prior wealth due to changes in the price 
of fish off the boat, wholesale prices, and exclusive deals be-
tween new processors and the now-consolidated fishermen.80
In some catch share programs, processors are also granted 
quotas. In Alaska’s Bering Sea king crab fishery, a handful of 
major processors ended up with exclusive buying rights to a 
percentage of most crab deliveries. As a result, some proces-
sors were guaranteed an astounding 90 percent of crab deliv-
eries, leaving fishermen with only 10 percent of the product 
to deliver where they wanted.81 Meanwhile, the smaller 
processors and ports that cannot arrange deals with quota 
owners are often forced to close, further hurting communities 
linked to small-boat fishing.82 
Quotas can also change the social dynamics of a community. 
Quota owners can choose to avoid the discomfort of dealing 
directly with struggling fishermen by leasing through proces-
sors instead, thereby further consolidating the fishery through 
vertical integration.83 These processors can then schedule 
guaranteed deliveries with leasing fishermen, controlling both 
supply and demand (and therefore the prices) for fresh fish.84 
Crew Life After Catch Shares in the Bering Sea 
Red King Crab Fishery
In a recent report, former and current crew members and 
skippers in the Bering Sea red king crab fishery described 
the changes for crews after the implementation of catch 
share “rationalization.”59 The crab fishery lost 177 vessels 
in the four years following rationalization, causing signifi-
cant unemployment.60 In interviews, the fishermen de-
scribed how crews made less money after rationalization, 
since owners compensated for the cost of leasing quota 
by taking 70 to 80 percent of the gross value of the crab 
catch before calculating crew pay.61 Many explained that 
crews now work long hours for many more months.62 One 
estimated that captain shares have dropped from around 
14 percent of catch value to 7 percent, while crew shares 
have dropped from 6 to 3 percent.63 These fishermen 
generally do not consider the fishery to be any safer, since 
owners only hire a minimum number of crew members and 
have deadlines to meet for processors.64 Some of them 
mourn the loss of their way of life and some of the small 
fishing communities of Alaska.65
Some crew members’ reactions to catch shares:
“Last season I worked more months, caught as much 
crab as I ever caught in my life but it was not the biggest 
paycheck I’ve ever gotten. You work longer and get paid 
less.”66
“They say it was for security purposes but people still die 
every year. The only difference is that there are fewer boats 
now, so there are less people getting hurt. But they’re do-
ing the same work.”67
“On some boats, people are taking home more, on other 
boats less. BUT the big change is that if you look at this 
on a per hour basis, crew are making significantly less. 
Now they are working 10 months for what they might have 
made in 2 months. Much more time away from family on 
top of this per hour aspect.”68
“There are less boats and crew has no opportunity. You 
have to own your own boat to advance.”69
“People get into fishing to try to make a good living and 
they take the risks, but the people making the money are 
the people who don’t take any risks. Owners can lease out 
the quotas and sit on their butts when the guys are out 
there.”70
“It wasn’t just a job, it was a way of life and they took that 
from me too.”71
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Safety for Fishermen
Catch shares are touted as a sure method for increasing safe-
ty for fishermen,92 but the data is unclear that such programs 
reduce accidents and deaths at sea.93 The anticipated safety 
benefit of catch shares systems is that fishermen no longer 
have to race for fish. However, a survey of fishermen safety in 
six countries found that some fisheries managed with catch 
shares, especially those with quota aggregation and quota 
leasing, tended to continue to have major vessel accidents 
and fishing fatalities.94 Overall, the data is mixed. Some 
fisheries have experienced reductions in search and rescue 
missions (for example, Alaska’s halibut and sablefish fishery 
saw a 63 percent reduction in missions after catch shares 
were implemented),95 while others have seen no improve-
ment (fisheries in Iceland, New Zealand and even the United 
States maintained high accident rates).96 
Destroying Communities for Private Profit
Fishing communities are a vibrant part of the cultural 
and economic fabric of the United States. Fishing pro-
vides more than just local jobs and the ability to work for 
oneself or with friends, neighbors and family members; it 
serves as the basis for community character and enforc-
es a traditional form of social equity — those that work 
hard gain benefits from their labor. Fishermen can main-
tain control over the quality and quantity of their product, 
allowing them to determine how best to maximize their 
personal profit, use natural resources wisely to provide 
benefits now and for the future, and ensure safe and local 
seafood for consumers.
This culture is being lost in the rush to implement catch 
shares across the United States, as catch share programs 
can force fishermen to be little more than a controlled 
labor force working for private firms. In 2009, the Milken 
Institute hosted a panel to discuss catch shares during a 
conference that brought together CEOs, entrepreneurs, 
venture capitalists and government officials.85 Staff 
members from the Environmental Defense Fund (EDF), 
one of they key proponents of catch shares, highlighted 
the private investment opportunities of catch share pro-
grams. In the pitch to bring in investors, David Festa, vice 
president of the West Coast for EDF, described fishermen 
as “unskilled,” “unprofessional” and “itinerant labor that 
bounces around from job to job” with “high drug use.”86 
He went on to liken fisheries to ill-performing factories 
that simply need outside investment to retrain workers so 
that owners can turn a profit, and suggested that  
 
 
the value of the fishery tends to increase by a factor of 
four once the fisheries are essentially in private hands.87 
He also highlighted the favorable political climate in the 
federal agencies and asked for “help in pushing forward 
these changes both in terms of the political process 
but also in terms of bringing capital to the table to help 
grease the skids.”88 
Another EDF consultant at the meeting, Larry Band, ex-
pressed disregard for the lives and livelihoods of indepen-
dent fishermen when he complained that “unfortunately, 
as you deal with the reality of getting catch shares imple-
mented, it’s a very democratic process with the voices of 
people on the water an important part of whether or not 
catch shares move forward.”89 He further suggested fleet 
buy-backs as an opportunity to target smaller fishermen 
who turn less profit, “giving them an honorable exit from 
the industry.”90 Mr. Band likened catch shares to financial 
stocks and suggested returns for investors as high as 10 
to 20 times the initial value of the shares.91
Among all this discussion of outside capital invest-
ment, profit returns, trading and brokerage options, and 
catch shares as financial securities, there seems to be 
disregard and even disdain for the culture of traditional 
smaller-scale U.S. fishermen. The long-standing dignity 
and independence that fishing communities represent as 
providers of seafood to U.S. consumers are being lost in 
the rush to make our fisheries profitable for businessmen, 
not fishermen.
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Fishery Health
Declining fishery health is a global problem. One study esti-
mated 63 percent of assessed fish stocks worldwide require 
lower exploitation rates so that populations can rebuild.97 
Some scholars claim catch share programs are the solution 
to wide-scale fisheries collapse.98 Their essential argument is 
that ownership of a resource implies stewardship of that re-
source. By giving individuals and firms private, assured rights 
to a formerly public resource, these “owners” supposedly 
become invested in the long-term health of the fishery and 
modify their behavior to promote sustainability.
This assertion has been countered in research and in history. 
Resource stewardship is not inherently linked to ownership. 
For instance, unsustainable farming practices on private 
lands in the 1930s were a major cause of the Dust Bowl 
tragedy.99 Studies have shown that it is theoretically possible 
in a catch share system that fishing a stock to extinction 
could bring a quota holder the most profit — another reason 
why ultimate management powers should remain in the 
public sector.100 Fundamentally, quota holders are individu-
als with no control over the fish stocks, marine environment 
or the behavior of others (including other quota holders, 
predators and exploitive marine industries like mining)101 
and cannot be relied on to recover stocks through indi-
vidual actions. This is particularly true since, while quotas 
grant someone a private market asset, quota holders are still 
competing against each other to get the best fish from the 
ocean.102 This can lead them to adopt practices that damage 
the fish stocks and the broader ecosystem. 
In fact, research focusing on the implementation of the 
New England groundfish sectors program suggests that the 
catch shares program has replaced the traditional fishing 
community focus on diverse and adaptive fishing strategies 
— strategies that consider habitat, migratory patterns and 
fishing gear.103 Rather than increasing fishermen’s personal 
investment in the fishery and encouraging cooperation to 
spur long-term sustainable management, the sector program 
has motivated fishermen to attain short-term goals, such as 
maximizing their quota usage and raising the value of their 
quota share.104
The National Research Council concluded in 1999 that 
“much of the political support for [catch shares] is similarly 
driven by faith in the assumption that privatization will foster 
ecological sensibility.”105 The NRC felt that catch shares may 
promote conservation by keeping catch below the TAC, but 
only with proper monitoring, enforcement and penalties for 
violators.106 As highlighted in their opinion, the key manage-
ment strategy to ensure conservation is the existence of a 
biologically based TAC, with catch shares being one way, but 
not the only way, to implement this conservation strategy.107
Essentially, two goals are being conflated: the goal to return 
stocks to sustainable levels and the goal to create economic 
efficiency by reducing the number of fishermen.108 
Most catch share programs, however, have been put into 
place in fisheries where overfishing had already been re-
duced or eliminated through other management scenarios, 
most commonly through catch limits such as TACs.109 By 
distributing quota based on historical catch amounts, catch 
share programs may actually be rewarding those that fish the 
hardest and fastest using gear associated with more envi-
ronmental problems, but that boost catch quantity.110 For 
example, industrial-scale “factory fish” boats frequently use 
equipment that can catch large amounts of fish quickly, but 
can also damage the ocean floor and kill other wildlife un-
necessarily in the process.111 
Quota holders compete against 
each other to get the best fish 
from the ocean, which can lead 
them to adopt practices that 
damage the broader ecosystem.
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Stock Assessments
There is much debate as to whether fish stocks recover or 
decline as a consequence of catch shares. Recent studies 
disagree on the issue. One study that focused on the landings 
data of over 11,000 fisheries concluded that, on average, the 
121 fisheries managed by catch shares were less prone to 
collapse.112 However, this study has been criticized for fail-
ing to differentiate between landings increases due to catch 
shares management and landings increases due to the en-
forcement of a sustainable catch limit.113 An opposing study 
painted a much more complicated picture by looking at fish 
numbers, use of habitat-damaging gear and commercial 
landings data in 15 North American catch share programs. 
The author concluded that results varied widely between 
programs and that the implementation of catch shares in 
these 15 separate regional examples did not ensure ecologi-
cal sustainability.114 
Fish populations under some of the most mature catch share 
systems in the world are still overfished. In New Zealand, the 
percentage of assessed stocks below target levels increased 
from 15 percent to more than 30 percent between 2006 and 
2010. In 2010, almost a quarter of New Zealand fish stocks 
experienced overfishing, 6 percent were collapsed and 13 
percent were depleted.115 In another example, Norway’s cod 
stocks dropped to the lowest quota ever available in 2006 
after years of catch share management.116 Meanwhile, U.S. 
catch share programs have shown little evidence that quotas 
are increasing fish stocks. For instance, the Alaskan sablefish 
population, managed under catch shares since 1995, tended 
to have lower TACs after this catch share program was imple-
mented, as seen in Figure 1.117 And recent TACs in Iceland’s 
fisheries have almost uniformly been reduced due to declin-
ing populations, as shown in Figure 2.118 
Figure 1: Catch Shares Have Failed to Increase TACs in the Alaskan Sablefish Fishery119 
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Discarding
Stocks can continue to decline under catch shares due to a 
number of problems inherent in the system design. One of 
these flaws pushes fishermen to discard some of their catch. 
By restricting fishermen to the amount of fish in their quota 
and making it too expensive to acquire additional quota, 
fishermen may feel compelled to discard smaller fish that will 
bring in less profit at the dock. This process, called “high-
grading,” can result in dead or dying fish tossed overboard, 
depleting fish stocks while yielding no profit for fishermen. 
Discarding and high-grading have been described as “an 
almost inevitable outcome of quota-managed fisheries.”121 
The implementation of catch shares typically increases pres-
sure to discard and high-grade, particularly in multi-species 
fisheries.122 In the Icelandic cod fishery, small cod is only 
slightly above quota price. Predicted levels of discard due to 
high-grading are 4.7 percent for gillnetting (a type of net-
based fishing) and 2.7 percent for longline fishing (a method 
using lines with baited hooks), while observations estimate 
it to be 3 percent and 1 percent, respectively.123 Collectively 
speaking, this means a lot: Modeling suggests that gillnet 
and longline vessels discard 67 percent and 25 percent of 
their total small cod catch, respectively.124 An existing ban on 
discarding fish in Iceland is therefore ineffective. 
Bycatch — marine wildlife that is unintentionally caught 
while fishing for other species — can also increase under 
catch share programs. For example, catch shares could 
increase the risk of fishermen catching endangered sea 
turtles in the Gulf of Mexico, as they are more likely to be 
accidently caught with some types of gear than others.125 
Furthermore, fishery recovery efforts are hampered when 
bycatch is not reported, a problem that can intensify under 
catch share programs. In 2005, New Zealand’s largest fishery 
noted that unmonitored boats, particularly those with foreign 
owners, significantly underreported their bycatch.126 
The United States already has high levels of discarding, 
and it is unlikely that catch share programs will improve 
the situation. In 2002, estimates suggest that U.S. fisheries 
discarded 2.33 billion pounds of fish while landing 8.19 
billion pounds, a discard-to-landings ratio of 0.28 — one of 
the highest in the world.127 Three methods are suggested to 
reduce bycatch: modifying existing gear, changing to more 
selective gear (for example, changing from drift gill net fish-
ing to trolling or from trawls to traps), and reducing fishing 
effort.128 Low-impact fishing could be incentivized through 
better fisheries management. Unfortunately, the reverse is 
currently happening: Larger boats with less selective fishing 
methods are becoming dominant in the new privatized and 
consolidated catch share fisheries around the world.
Unreported catches can have major consequences for fishery 
management. Statistics are distorted, leading to inaccura-
cies in stock assessments, resulting in lowered TACs. In turn, 
Figure 2: The State of Fish Stocks* in Iceland120
Species Landings in 2009 (in 
pounds)
Recommended TAC for 
2010/2011 (in pounds)
Percent change
Cod 401,240,000 352,740,000 12 percent decrease
Haddock 180,780,000 99,210,000 45 percent decrease
Pollock (Saithe) 134,480,000 88,180,000 34 percent decrease
Golden redfish 85,980,000 66,140,000 23 percent decrease
Icelandic slope redfish 41,890,000 22,050,000 47 percent decrease
Deep pelagic redfish 114,640,000 44,090,000 62 percent decrease
Greenland halibut 59,520,000 11,020,000 81 percent decrease
Plaice 13,890,000 14,330,000 3 percent increase
Wolffish (Atlantic catfish) 33,950,000 18,740,000 45 percent decrease
Ling 24,250,000 16,530,000 32 percent decrease
Tusk 18,300,000 13,230,000 28 percent decrease
Great silver smelt 23,810,000 17,640,000 26 percent decrease
*Only species with 2009 landings greater than 10,000,000 pounds are included, with the exception of the lumpsucker, summer spawn herring, Norwegian 
spring spawning herring, blue whiting, mackerel and pearlside, which did not have recommended TACs for 2010/2011 at time of publication and are there-
fore excluded from this table.
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lowered TACs further incentivize unreported catches. In the 
extreme case, severe underreporting could lead to fisheries 
collapse.129
Monitoring
The success of catch share programs depends significantly on 
good data collection from both quota and non-quota holders 
who fish in related fisheries. Unreported landings, high-grad-
ing and discarding all weaken and can destroy the market for 
quota shares.130 One of the only fisheries with significant and 
proven reductions in discard rates is the multispecies ground-
fish trawl fishery in British Columbia, which has 100 percent 
at-sea observer coverage and dockside monitoring.131 At-sea 
observer coverage curbs discarding and high-grading, while 
dockside check-ins verify catch amounts and help main-
tain quotas and TAC in real-time. Without these monitoring 
measures, catch shares cannot be a successful management 
tool, and most fisheries do not have these extensive methods 
in place. 
Illegal landings, in which fish are caught and sold without 
proper documentation, are also a problem in quota-regulated 
fisheries. Illegal landings are estimated to be between 10 
and 30 percent of the legal catch weight in fisheries.132 And 
contrary to the common assumption that getting around the 
quota limit in a quota-regulated fishery leads to less demand 
for quotas and therefore lower prices for them, poorly man-
aged catch share fisheries can result in both raised quota 
prices and significant non-compliance. 133 This is because 
non-compliant boats can more easily hide their illegal catch 
if they are already catching a very large amount of fish, 
which raises the demand for quota. Essentially, it is harder for 
someone monitoring the boats to notice 100 pounds of ille-
gal catch if it is mixed in with 1,000 pounds of legal catch.134 
The United States struggles with data collection and enforce-
ment. In recent years, the National Marine Fisheries Service 
(NMFS) only analyzed 66 fishing trips of catch share program 
vessels in the Gulf of Mexico red snapper fishery in 2009 
and 55 in 2008.135 In 2009, 1,898 red snapper were kept 
while 2,245 (more than half of the total catch) were caught 
accidently and then discarded, were discarded dead, or met 
some other unknown fate rather than being sold at dock-
side.136 These bycatch numbers were significantly worse than 
the 2008 numbers,137 when only about a quarter of the total 
red snapper catch was discarded. This indicates that catch 
shares do not minimize bycatch problems over time and 
might actually make them worse.
The National Research Council (NRC) suggested catch share 
programs could improve data collection and enforcement by 
levying fees to fund on-board and/or dockside-monitoring 
programs.138 New catch share programs in the United States 
are looking for ways to pass those costs on to fishermen, but 
the systems proposed could only further hurt smaller-scale 
fishermen. For example, in the New England sectors pro-
gram, which the NRC highlighted as one of the most difficult 
regions to monitor and enforce (due to the large number 
of small boats and numerous ports),139 the necessary im-
provements for monitoring the catch shares program were 
estimated by a local research institute to cost between $6 
million and $12 million.140 While the federal government 
will be subsidizing much of the initial implementation,141 on-
board observer costs are estimated to stay at $700 to $1,000 
a trip.142 While large quota holders will have few problems 
paying, smaller fishermen, who are already working at the 
margins of profitability and suffering the additional costs of 
quota leases, may not be able to endure. Without long-term 
federal support, monitoring costs could drive the remaining 
small fishermen out of the industry.
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The Dubious Legal Grounds for Catch 
Shares
The fish in our nation’s waters are public resources, held 
in the public trust for the people of the United States.143 As 
such, the government has the responsibility to promote ac-
cess while balancing conservation needs and to compensate 
the public for any private use of the resource.144
The NRC complied a list of four key ramifications of the pub-
lic trust doctrine for catch share programs: 
First, in light of the essential inalienability of public trust 
resources, it reinforces concerns about the “giveaway” of 
public resources to private interests. Second, it confers on 
government a continuing duty of supervision and a respon-
sibility to choose courses of action least destructive to trust 
resources. Third, it strengthens the principle set forth in the 
Magnuson-Stevens Act [the primary federal law on fisheries 
management] that individual quotas are privileges, creating 
no property rights and therefore subject to modification or 
revocation without compensation to their holders. Finally, 
it suggests that conferring exclusive rights of use should be 
accompanied by some form of compensation to the public.145
Despite the NRC’s warnings that the policy of ocean priva-
tization through catch share programs treads dangerously 
close to betraying the public trust, NMFS continues to pro-
mote quota systems for all federally managed fisheries in the 
United States. 
Under the Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation and 
Management Act (referred to subsequently as the Act), all 
fishery management plans, not just catch share programs, are 
instructed to “take into account the importance of fishery re-
sources to fishing communities … in order to (A) provide for 
the sustained participation of such communities, and (B) to 
the extent practicable, minimize adverse economic impacts 
on such communities.”146 But as shown in previous sections, 
catch share programs are rife with adverse economic impacts 
on small fishermen and communities. The programs frequent-
ly fail to meet specific requirements to provide “fair and 
equitable initial allocations” of quota, prevent “excessive” 
consolidation, and set aside portions of the catch for entry-
level fishermen and small-vessel owners and crews.147 
Furthermore, catch share programs are being implemented 
with a disingenuous presentation of cost. The Act requires 
management costs of catch share programs to be fully 
recovered through program administration, but in 2005 the 
Government Accountability Office criticized NMFS for fail-
ing to do just that.148 Since costs are not always recovered, 
the U.S. public is essentially funding the administration and 
management of a private industry making money from a pub-
lic resource — one that the public can no longer access.
The dubious legal standing of privatized catch share pro-
grams extends into international law as well. Most notably, 
fishermen in Iceland, fed up with paying significant leasing 
costs to private quota holders for the ability to fish a public 
resource, took their grievances before the United Nations 
Human Rights Committee. After reviewing the issue, the 
committee ruled that privatized catch share systems violated 
international law and the human rights of fishermen.149  
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Learning from International Experience
More than 10 percent of the total ocean fish catch is cur-
rently taken under catch share programs.150 Many of these 
programs have run into enormous problems with design, 
management and legality. Understanding their failures and 
successes should help the United States avoid the same mis-
takes and achieve similar successes. 
Iceland – An Illegal System
Fishing is a major industry for Iceland, accounting for 37 
percent of product merchandise exports and 8 percent of the 
gross domestic product in 2008.151 After experimenting with 
catch shares in the 1980s, Iceland extended the program 
to all its major fisheries in the Fisheries Management Act of 
1990.152 The 19 species subject to catch shares in Iceland ac-
counted for more than 97 percent of the value of catch taken 
in Iceland’s waters in 2005.153
Iceland’s catch share system mirrors the privatized quota 
model closely. Fisheries are subject to TAC limits, quotas are 
assets of indefinite duration that can be divided and trans-
ferred and are subject to fees, and fishery managers initially 
allocate quotas based on catch history.154 Other measures, 
such as gear restrictions, size limits and fishing closures, are 
also used.155
Iceland’s fisheries have consolidated significantly under catch 
shares — large, vertically integrated companies have come 
to dominate the seas. People often use feudal metaphors to 
describe the current political economy of fishing in Iceland. 
For instance, people refer to large catch share holders as 
“lords of the sea” because they dictate who gets to fish and 
they control the quantities and quota-leasing rates.156 
Since its implementation, the Icelandic catch share system 
has endured numerous legal and social challenges. Initially, 
the only boats allowed in a fishery were those grandfathered 
in when the quota system was enacted. In 1998, the Supreme 
Court of Iceland found this rule was unconstitutional on the 
grounds that it treated citizens unfairly.157 After this ruling, 
new fishermen could be licensed to fish, but still had to ac-
quire quota on the market — meaning they must purchase it 
from others. This has been exceedingly difficult for new fish-
ermen, who do not have the advantage of leveraging existing 
quotas for loans.
Catch shares have generated a great deal of wealth for a 
few,158 but at the cost of many. A variety of affected commu-
nity members oppose the program: small-vessel owners who 
entered the system after quota allocation; fishing crew mem-
bers, especially those who work on vessels with reduced 
quota or who are forced by the vessel owners to help pay for 
quota purchases; and community groups and inhabitants of 
small fishing villages and towns where people have lost their 
jobs due to insufficient quota or none at all.159 Communities 
have not been eligible for quota under the Icelandic system, 
only individuals, and as quota has consolidated in larger 
ports, small town inhabitants have suffered from increased 
unemployment160   
Iceland attempted to alleviate the unequal distribution of 
wealth under the system and make the industry more acces-
sible to new fishermen161 by instituting a catch fee, starting at 
6 percent in 2004 and increasing to 9.5 percent by 2009.162 
The government levies this fee in addition to fees for moni-
toring, enforcement and stock assessments.163 Studies have 
shown that a 9.5 percent catch fee is still too low to even 
recover costs from fishing subsidies,164 meaning that the pub-
lic is forced to finance at least some portion of the privatized 
profits of the industry.
Ultimately, several fishermen took their case to the United 
Nations Human Rights Committee, alleging that privatiza-
tion violated the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights by forcing fishermen without quotas to pay money to 
a privileged group of citizens (the quota holders) in order to 
pursue their occupation. 
In Oct 2007, the committee sided with the fishermen, ruling 
that Iceland’s privatized catch share market violated interna-
tional law.165 The majority of the committee members argued 
that quota no longer used by the original holders should 
revert to the state for equitable allocation. 
The Icelandic government is currently investigating ways 
to dismantle its catch share programs in light of this court 
finding, as well as the widespread sentiment in Iceland that 
catch shares are unfair and accusations that speculative 
investments by fishermen with windfall catch share profits 
contributed to Iceland’s 2008 economic collapse.166 The 
Icelandic government is expected to send another wave of 
bankruptcy through the fisheries when it recalls these catch 
share permits.167 The fishermen cut out of the system by the 
catch shares program will not be compensated, as Iceland 
has stated that doing so would be too expensive and could 
expose them to a host of lawsuits.168
New Zealand – The Social Costs of Vertical 
Integration 
New Zealand’s catch share program, called the Quota 
Management System (QMS) manages 100 commercially sig-
nificant fish stocks that contributed more than $1 billion dol-
lars in export revenues in 2000.169 The QMS has even fewer 
regulatory restrictions than Iceland’s program170 — quotas 
are granted explicitly in perpetuity and are fully transferable 
between citizens, making the quotas very susceptible to con-
solidation issues.171 New Zealand’s policies have led directly 
to major reductions in the number of small-scale fishermen, 
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leaving a fleet dominated by vertically integrated companies 
with large vessels.
Before adopting catch shares, New Zealand first reduced 
its fishing fleet by 37 percent by excluding all part-time 
(small-scale) fishermen from commercial fishing.172 The QMS 
initially distributed quota in 1986 as specific weights of fish, 
but soon changed its allocations to percentages of the TAC.173 
As soon as one year later, small-scale operators were already 
losing ground to firms accumulating quota. By the end of 
1987, nine companies owned 86 percent of the lucrative 
orange roughy quota.174 
Smaller-scale fishermen have generally lost their place in the 
fishery under the combined weight of “reductions in TACs to 
rebuild stocks, increases in cost recovery levies [fees], high 
aggregations limits, aging of fishery participants, and the 
vertically-integrated seafood companies’ desire to increase 
quota holdings.”175 
The government of New Zealand has placed some limits on 
the aggregation of quotas, but fishermen often circumvent 
them by establishing multiple holding companies and plac-
ing quotas in family trusts, rather than keeping all their quota 
in a single pot.176 For example, in 1998, “a single company 
in a relatively small fishery (in terms of numbers of entrants) 
used three holding and allied companies to hold 24, 22, 
and 171 tons of catching rights.”177 Companies can also be 
exempted from aggregation limits. Exemptions allowing the 
aggregation of 35 to 45 percent of stock were common be-
tween 1988 and 1999, and in some cases, officials have al-
lowed an exemption for owning quota for an entire stock.178 
In 1997, two companies each received 45 percent of the fish 
stock of alfonsino and barracuda.179 
The result is large-scale consolidation and vertical integration 
by firms buying significant amounts of quota. In 1996, one 
study found that the 10 largest companies owned 75 percent 
of the shares and purchased between 46 and 100 percent of 
their quota.180 Two of the companies, Sealord and Sanford, 
increased their quota holdings from 10.7 to 25.5 percent 
and 9.5 to 20.2 percent, respectively.181 Economic efficiency 
in New Zealand has come at the cost of the jobs of 3,000 
small-scale fishermen and social upheaval in small fishing 
communities.182 
Catch share supporters regard consolidation as a positive 
outcome, arguing that there are currently too many boats 
chasing too few fish, and reducing the number of boats will 
lead to healthier fish populations.183 But despite significant 
consolidation in New Zealand, many of their fish popula-
tions are still struggling. (See Figure 2 on page 10.) 
New Zealand’s QMS has also had many legal battles over 
fishing rights with the indigenous population, the Maori.184 
After courts found that the QMS violated the 1840 Treaty of 
Waitangi, the New Zealand government settled by purchas-
ing quota and a share in one of the largest fishing companies 
in New Zealand and transferring it to the tribes.185 Essentially 
the government was forced to buy, for the equivalent of more 
than $100 million U.S. dollars,186 a public resource from a 
private entity in order to transfer it to another private entity. 
The Maori are still the majority holders of that company.187 
Namibia – Holistic Fisheries Management: A 
National Benefit
When Namibia gained its independence from South Africa 
in 1990, it inherited fisheries greatly depleted by decades of 
overexploitation by European and Eastern Bloc countries.188 
Faced with the challenges of restoring both fisheries stocks 
and the security of its citizens, Namibia developed a catch 
share program that derives financial benefits for both fisher-
men and citizens. This program exemplifies that catch share 
systems can be implemented in ways that avoid the pitfalls 
of privatization and job loss inherent in the current U.S. ap-
proach to catch shares. 
Namibia is one of the top 10 fishing nations in the world,189 
catching large amounts of hake, horse mackerel and pil-
chard.190 Similar to the United States, Namibia regards fish 
in its territorial waters as a natural resource belonging to the 
Namibian citizens.191 Namibia manages their stocks by set-
ting a TAC for seven key species and distributing non-trans-
ferable individual quotas among rights holders.192 Essentially, 
the Namibian government acts as a leasing manager for the 
fish and collects rents for the right to catch fish.
Namibia uses its catch share program to incentivize man-
agement goals important to the country, such as increas-
ing the employment of its citizens and correcting for years 
of pervasive human rights injustices under South Africa’s 
apartheid system.193 Fishing rights are granted for limited 
periods of time (seven, 10, 15 or 20 years), depending on the 
level of investment in the fishery and the level of Namibian 
ownership and employment, among other factors.194 In 
2005, 13,500 people were employed in Namibian fisher-
ies, of which 5,575 (68 percent of whom were Namibians) 
were employed with on-board vessels and 7,925 (98 percent 
of whom were Namibians) worked ashore.195 Rights and 
quota are not freely transferable, “so as not to undermine the 
Government’s goals of Namibianisation and empowerment 
within the sector.”196 In 2003, Namibians held 162 of the 163 
distributed fishing rights.197
As one of the few countries in the world to successfully 
capture significant resource rents,198 Namibia collects several 
fees from the fishery sector: quota fees, a fee specifically to 
fund research and training, a fee on bycatch, and license 
fees for vessels and processing facilities.199 Fees totaled about 
$13.2 million in 2003.200 Unlike catch share programs in 
the United States, there are no leasing fees to catch share 
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holders and no windfall profits. Fees are discounted based 
on Namibianisation criteria such as “degree of Namibian 
ownership, employment of Namibian crew, and whether fish 
was landed and/or processed in Namibia.”201 Namibia’s fish-
ing companies also contributed more than $5 million over 
14 years for the construction of schools, clinics and other 
needed civic facilities.202
Namibia’s fisheries are finding the balance between profit-
ability and sustainability. The fishing sector is consistently 
the second-largest sector of the Namibian economy203 and 
in 2005 it contributed $372.2 million to Namibia’s gross 
domestic product, up from $97.8 million a decade earlier (a 
380 percent increase).204 At the same time, many Namibian 
stocks are recovering from decades of foreign overfishing 
through active management of TACs.205 For example, the 
hake TAC grew from 132.3 million pounds in 1990206 to 
286.6 million pounds in 2006,207 and catches are anticipated 
to increase in the future.208
The Namibian system is not a perfect model for the complex 
fisheries of the United Sates. Because of its short history, 
the Namibian fishery has relatively few fishing vessels and 
they tend to be larger, older and fuel-inefficient.209 Almost 
all of the catch is delivered to two ports, making it easier 
to achieve high monitoring and enforcement rates.210 But 
despite these caveats, the United States should learn from 
Namibia’s commitment to sustainably maintaining its fish 
stock, incentivizing social and environmental goals, and 
sharing the benefits derived from catching fish equitably 
among the fishermen and citizens of its country.
Catch Shares Aren’t Fair
There is no question that our nation’s fisheries require 
responsible management systems to ensure their long-term 
health and profitability. The federal government has a duty to 
manage our fish for the benefit of the public. The assumption 
that only privatization can achieve this is false. Following the 
“common pool resources” research by Nobel Prize-winning 
economist Elinor Ostrom, a recent analysis of fisheries has 
shown that there are many paths to effective co-management 
of fisheries resources between the public and the govern-
ment.211 Quota systems may be a part of the answer, but they 
must not relinquish control of the resource.
As discussed in detail in this report, catch share systems, as 
implemented throughout the United States and the world, 
have typically resulted in an unfair giveaway of public 
resources to private entities. The gains in economic effi-
ciency hailed by supporters of catch shares have come at 
the expense of the livelihoods of thousands of smaller-scale, 
traditional fishermen and their communities, and the claims 
of increased fishery sustainability and safety are often over-
blown. The design of catch share programs has violated the 
Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Management Act, and internation-
al courts have found them in violation of human rights.
While FWW believes that allocating total allowable catch to 
fishermen can be one of many effective tools in addressing 
the modern challenges of fishery management, these pro-
grams must be rigorously designed to ensure that they retain 
public control of fishery resources and return a portion of the 
value of each fishery to the public. Allocations to fishermen 
must be fair and equitable, and the programs should include 
incentives to maintain a diverse fleet, minimize damage to 
the environment, allow new participants in the fishery, im-
prove stock assessments and fund community development.
By making sure that fishermen are part of the management 
process and are treated fairly, we can ensure that they belong 
to healthy communities and catch the fish in our markets us-
ing the best available practices. This promotes a better life for 
our nation’s fishermen and coastal and fishing communities, 
and a better product for consumers. 
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Appendix
Management Specifics of Selected Catch Share 
Programs
For the sake of clarity, we have chosen the term “catch share 
program” for discussion in this report, but in practice, these 
programs go by many names and have different management 
forms. We present here a short list of some of these programs 
with their official or more detailed names.
United States
• Alaska IFQ halibut and sablefish program (1995) – IFQ 
and CDQ
• Western Alaska community development program (1992) 
– CDQ
• Bering Sea and Aleutian Islands non-pollack coopera-
tives (2008) – LAPP and cooperatives
• Bering Sea and Aleutian Islands American Fisheries Act 
pollock cooperatives (1999) – cooperatives
• Bering Sea and Aleutian Islands Crab (King and Tanner) 
rationalization program (2005) – quota share and IFQ; 
harvester cooperatives; processor quota share and IPQ; 
CDQ.
• Central Gulf of Alaska rockfish (2007) – cooperative 
program
• Northeast (or New England) multispecies groundfish sec-
tor (2010) – sectors
• Georges Bank cod fixed gear sector (2006) – sectors, 
subsumed by the Northeast multispecies sectors
• Georges Bank cod hook sector (2004) – sectors, sub-
sumed by the Northeast multispecies sectors
• Atlantic sea scallop IFQ (2010) – IFQ
• Gulf of Mexico grouper and tilefish IFQ (2010) – IFQ
• Gulf of Mexico red snapper IFQ (2007) – IFQ
• Mid-Atlantic golden tilefish IFQ (2009) – IFQ
• Surf clam and ocean quahog ITQ (1990) – ITQ
• Pacific Sablefish permit stacking program (2002) – permit 
stacking, IFQ
• Pacific groundfish trawl rationalization (2011) – IFQ and 
cooperatives
• Wreckfish ITQ program (1992) – ITQ
 
International
• New Zealand: ITQ though the Quota Management 
System (QMS)
• Canada: British Columbia halibut fishery – ITQ
• Canada: Scotia-Fundy inshore mobile gear groundfish 
fishery – ITQ
• Canada: British Columbia groundfish trawl fishery - ITQ
• Australia: Southern Bluefin tuna fishery – ITQ
• Norway: Norwegian North Sea cod fishery – IVQ
• Iceland: ITQ
• Namibia: Individual quota (non-transferable)
Acronyms
CDQ Community development quota
IFQ Individual fishing quota
ITQ Individual transferable quota
IVQ Individual vessel quota
LAPP Limited access privilege program
NAS National Academy of Sciences
NMFS National Marine Fisheries Service
NOAA National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration
NRC National Research Council
QMS Quota Management System (New Zealand)
TAC Total allowable catch
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Glossary
At-sea observer coverage  
Fisheries monitoring where impartial observers inspect and 
identify the types and quantities of fish caught by a vessel in 
a fishing trip.
Bycatch  
Fish caught during the targeting of one fish species that are 
not of that species. These may be kept or discarded, depend-
ing on regulatory and economic motivators.
Catch and trade  
A fishery management system that caps the amount of fish 
that fishermen can catch using a total allowable catch and 
then portions out amounts of it to individuals. See also: catch 
shares.
Catch history  
The qualifying years of catch records for individual fishermen 
that fishery managers typically use during the planning of a 
catch share system to determine the percentage of quota to 
distribute in the initial allocation of shares.
Catch shares  
A fishery management system that divides a fishery’s total al-
lowable catch into discrete amounts that are gifted to individ-
uals, communities or associations. There are many forms of 
catch share programs, including individual transferable quota 
systems and individual fishing quota systems.
Catcher-processor  
A very large fishing vessel that both catches fish and process-
es them on-board.
Common-pool resources 
Resources that are held for public use, such as fish, ground-
water, national forests and public grazing lands. 
Community development quota  
Generally, an allocation of quota to a subsistence or artisanal 
fishing community. Fishery managers typically give them to 
communities that would otherwise be excluded or disadvan-
taged by catch share programs.
Discard  
Fish that are caught and then released instead of brought to 
market. These fish may be alive, dead or in unknown health.
Dockside monitoring 
Fisheries monitoring where impartial observers inspect and 
identify the types and quantity of fish caught when they are 
brought into port.
Finfish 
Vertebrate and cartilaginous fish species, excluding crusta-
ceans, mollusks and cephalopods.
Fishery  
An industry of fishing defined by a combination of factors, 
including the target fish species, a geographic area of fishing, 
fishing methods and gear types.
Fishery management plan (FMP)  
A management plan for a fishery operating in federal waters 
(typically between three and 200 nautical miles from shore). 
In the United States, these plans are produced by a regional 
fishery management council and authorized by the secretary 
of commerce.
Fleet reduction  
The removal of boats and fishermen from a fishery — one of 
the intended outcomes of catch shares programs.
Gear restrictions 
Limits placed on the type of gear used in a fishery. These may 
include gear type, amount and techniques.
Groundfish 
A term loosely applied to some commercially harvested fish; 
this group includes flounder, sole, pollock, cod and haddock.
High-grading  
A practice where fishermen discard lower-value fish of a 
targeted species in favor of keeping higher-value fish.
Individual fishing quota  
A tool where fishery managers allocate a certain portion, 
usually a percentage, of the total allowable catch (TAC) to 
individual vessels, fishermen or other designated recipients. 
Individual transferable quota 
An individual fishing quota that can be sold, leased, or given 
without penalty to another fisherman.
Limited access privilege program (LAPP)  
The term used in the Magnuson-Stevens Act (the Act) for the 
broad range of programs commonly called catch share pro-
grams. More specifically, LAPPs issue permits for a portion of 
the total allowable catch (TAC). LAPPS do not include com-
munity development quota as defined under the Act.
Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation and Management 
Act  
The federal legislation that establishes fishery management 
councils and the mandatory and discretionary guidelines for 
fishery management plans in the United States.
Multispecies fishery 
A fishery where fishermen catch more than one species 
simultaneously. Most fisheries are multispecies due to the 
imprecise nature of fishing gear.
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National Academy of Sciences (NAS) 
A private nonprofit society of scientists that advises Congress 
on federal government and technical matters.
National Marine Fishery Services (NMFS) 
The federal agency within NOAA that oversees fisheries sci-
ence and regulation.
National Oceanic and Atmospheric Association (NOAA)  
The federal agency within the Department of Commerce 
responsible for ocean and coastal management.
National Research Council (NRC) 
The operating arm of the National Academy of Sciences.
New Zealand Quota Management System (QMS) 
The overall fisheries management system in New Zealand. 
Open access  
A condition in which access to a fishery is unrestricted by 
permits, quota, gear type or other limits.
Overfishing  
Fishing that reduces fish stocks to a level below the rate at 
which the fish naturally replace themselves.
Permit      
A type of license that limits access to a fishery.
Quota    
A percentage or amount of fish that fishermen can harvest.
Race for fish  
A situation where fishermen compete to catch fish in a 
fishery with a total allowable catch (TAC) but no other 
restrictions.
Rationalization  
The term Alaskans use to describe their catch share manage-
ment program for crab fisheries.
Sectors management 
A type of catch shares program in the New England multi-
species fishery, where fishery managers distribute quota to 
groups of owners (sectors) instead of individual owners.     
Speculative fishing  
A practice where new fishing firms enter a fishery to establish 
a history of catch, in anticipation of windfall profits from new 
catch shares management.     
Total allowable catch (TAC) 
The total amount of fish that fishery managers will permit 
fishermen to catch in a fishery, typically in a given year.      
Tragedy of the commons 
The idea that multiple individuals will exploit and even 
deplete a common resource for their personal benefit, even 
when it is against everyone’s collective long-term interest.     
Vertical integration (in fisheries) 
A process in which individual fishing operations seek to 
control different stages of fish handling (catching, processing, 
marketing).      
Windfall profit 
A sudden influx of wealth created when fishery managers 
give quota to a limited number of fishermen in a catch share 
fishery.      
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